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The Space Policy of the Johnson Administration:
Project Apollo and International Cooperation*
Hirotaka WATANABE†
Abstract
After Kennedy’s assassination, the new President Johnson took over Project
Apollo with the U.S.-Soviet joint lunar exploration proposal. But the Johnson
administration implemented Project Apollo mostly through competition with the
Soviet Union. This article reexamines historically how the Johnson administration
implemented Project Apollo in terms of competition and cooperation with the
Soviet Union during the Cold War, analyzing why and how the possibility of U.S.-
Soviet joint lunar exploration disappeared from the policy choices. The Johnson
administration implemented Project Apollo through competition with the Soviet
Union to display U.S. power and ideas, while trying to advance other space
programs through cooperation with the Soviet Union to ease the East-West
tensions, as well as other countries to strengthen the Western bloc. In other words,
the Johnson administration implemented Project Apollo by keeping the balance
between international competition and cooperation through its comprehensive space
policy.
Introduction
Lyndon B. Johnson took over several critical issues of U.S. foreign policy from
John F. Kennedy. Project Apollo was one of them. In September 1963, President
Kennedy proposed a U.S.-Soviet joint lunar exploration before the United Nations
(UN) General Assembly, though the Kennedy administration two years earlier had
decided on and carried out Project Apollo mainly to defeat the Soviet Union in the
moon race. There had been serious discussions on the joint lunar exploration within
the government until President Kennedy was assassinated. If the new President
Johnson had put Kennedy’s UN moon proposal into practice, the first lunar landing
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might have been accomplished as a U.S.-Soviet joint project. But the Johnson
administration implemented Project Apollo mostly through competition with the
Soviet Union.
The two aspects of Project Apollo during the Kennedy administration,
competition and cooperation with the Soviet Union, have been examined especially
after the end of the Cold War. In contrast, those during the Johnson administration
have not been fully examined by taking advantage of the documents declassified in
the past decade.1) However, to implement Project Apollo did entail no fewer
political difficulties than to decide on it.
This article reexamines historically how the Johnson administration
implemented Project Apollo in terms of competition and cooperation with the
Soviet Union during the Cold War, analyzing why and how the possibility of U.S.-
Soviet joint lunar exploration disappeared from the policy choices of the Johnson
administration.2)
First, this article outlines Lyndon B. Johnson as a space champion and Project
Apollo during the Kennedy administration, as the background of the space policy of
the Johnson administration. Second, it examines how the new President Johnson
took over Project Apollo and made an incremental decision to implement Project
Apollo through competition with the Soviet Union during the year 1964. Third, it
touches upon how the Johnson administration advanced space cooperation with the
Western countries. Fourth, it describes how the Johnson administration continued to
pursue U.S.-Soviet space cooperation while advancing Project Apollo steadily
during the second term of the administration.
Finally, this article answers the question: “Why did the possibility of U.S.-
Soviet joint lunar exploration disappear from the policy choices of the Johnson
administration?” Conversely, “Why did President Johnson reach the conclusion that
Project Apollo should be implemented through not cooperation but competition
with the Soviet Union?” It also discusses the purpose and meaning of Project
Apollo as the space policy of the Johnson administration in the Cold War,
compared with that of the Kennedy administration.
A Space Champion: Lyndon B. Johnson
During the late 1950s and early 1960s, Lyndon B. Johnson was the very space
champion in U.S. politics. His achievements in space policy were as follows: the
U.S. response to the Soviet Sputnik as Senate Majority Leader and Chairman of the
Preparedness Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, the creation of the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) as Senate Majority Leader
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and Chairman of the Special Committee on Space and Astronautics, and the
decision of Project Apollo as Vice President and Chairman of the National
Aeronautics and Space Council (NASC).
When the Soviet Union succeeded in launching its first satellite, Sputnik 1, on 4
October 1957, Johnson was at his ranch in Texas. It is said that looking up the
satellite flying across the sky, he “started to realize that this country of mine might
perhaps not be ahead in everything.”3) With the “Sputnik shock” as a start, he
became deeply involved in U.S. space policy. To investigate the U.S. failure to be
first in space, Johnson managed the national and bipartisan hearings before his
Preparedness Subcommittee from 25 November 1957 to 23 January 1958.
Comparing the Soviet achievement to “Pearl Harbor” as the Japanese surprise
attack of 7 December 1941, he stressed the importance of catching and passing the
Soviet Union in space. Johnson finally submitted the report composed of seventeen
recommendations, which would ask for increased space and missile spending, large
rocket boosters for spaceflights, and a new federal space agency.
In February 1958, according to Johnson’s report, the Senate voted to create the
Special Committee on Space and Astronautics, which was to enact legislation for
the new federal space agency. Johnson was unanimously chosen as its chairman.
Although the Eisenhower administration wanted to establish a compact space
agency and an advisory board for the agency, Johnson desired a more powerful
space agency and a high-level space policy-making board such as the National
Security Council (NSC). After the heated discussion and compromise between
them, President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed on 29 July 1958 the “National
Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958,” which would establish the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the National Aeronautics and
Space Council (NASC).4)
Through his activities in U.S. Congress, Johnson asserted that the United States
should win the space race with the Soviet Union. But he also advocated
international cooperation in space for peace. Just after the NASA act was passed,
Johnson stated in the U.S. Senate that “one of the finest actions of this Congress
was its clear expression that the exploration of outer space should be a joint venture
by all members of the United Nations.”5) Then, Johnson supported the U.S.
proposal for the international control of outer space before the Political Committee
of the UN General Assembly in November 1958. He argued on behalf of the
American people that the United Nations “should assume the responsibility of
leadership in promoting international cooperation in the exploration of outer
space,” stressing the peaceful uses of outer space.6)
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Thus Johnson succeeded in enhancing his fame as Democratic candidate for the
1960 presidential election, by practicing both “statesmanship” and “good politics”
through U.S. space policy making. But it was John F. Kennedy who was
inaugurated as President in January 1961. Johnson became Vice President. The new
President gave Johnson the responsibility for the space policy making by
designating him as Chairman of NASC for the following three reasons.7) First,
Johnson was far more versed in U.S. space policy than Kennedy. Second, the
failure in U.S. space efforts might damage the presidency. Kennedy hoped to make
a scapegoat of Vice President in time of need. Third, Vice President should be
given some specific jobs so as not to interfere in President’s authority. Probably
understanding the reasons, Johnson accepted the job to be a great Vice President.
Project Apollo during the Kennedy Administration8)
Although Kennedy, as well as Johnson, asserted that the United States should
win the space race with the Soviet Union in the 1960 presidential campaign, the
Kennedy administration formulated its space policy for international cooperation in
the first months of the administration to relieve the East-West tensions, especially
in the third world.
In April 1961, however, the Kennedy administration suffered the two shocks,
the “Gagarin shock” and the “Bay of Pigs shock.” The Soviet Union succeeded in
the first human spaceflight by putting Yuri A. Gagarin aboard Vostok 1 into the
Earth orbit on 12 April. Subsequently, the Kennedy administration failed badly in
the invasion of the Bay of Pigs in Cuba to overthrow the Castro administration
several days after Gagarin’s flight. Kennedy ordered Johnson to investigate the
present U.S. space activities and propose a new space program to beat the Soviet
Union in space. Drawing together various opinions within the government,
Congress, and communities of space specialists, Johnson completed the consensus-
building to decide on a new space program, which would realize the first human
lunar landing. In his memorandum for the President, Johnson recommended that we
should tackle the “manned exploration of the moon” by 1966 or 1967, in order to
attain “world leadership in space during this decade.”9)
Thanks to Johnson’s efforts, the Kennedy administration decided swiftly on
Project Apollo in May 1961. However, even right after the announcement of
Project Apollo, the Kennedy administration also tried to realize some U.S.-Soviet
space cooperation including human lunar exploration. In the Vienna summit of June
1961, Kennedy proposed U.S.-Soviet joint lunar exploration to Soviet Premier
Nikita S. Khrushchev in order to confirm the Soviet response to Project Apollo, and
43OSAKA UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW No. 57 (February 2010)
found a political and diplomatic value in the realization of the U.S.-Soviet space
cooperation. The Kennedy administration continued to seek after space cooperation
with the Soviet Union while advancing Project Apollo.
After the UN General Assembly resolution for international space cooperation
of December 1961, the Kennedy administration started the negotiations through the
NASA-Soviet Science Academy channel about space science cooperation when
John H. Glenn succeeded in the first U.S. orbital flight aboard the Mercury
spacecraft Friendship 7 on 21 February 1962.
The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 made the Kennedy administration
recognize the importance of both international cooperation and competition through
space policy. While Kennedy made up his mind to proceed firmly with Project
Apollo to compete with the Soviet Union, he continued the negotiations with the
Soviet Union about space science cooperation. Supporting the implementation of
Project Apollo, Vice President Johnson as Chairman of NASC was mainly involved
in communications satellite problems, which would lead to the creation of the
International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (INTELSAT) in August
1964.10)
On 20 September 1963, President Kennedy proposed U.S.-Soviet space
cooperation through Project Apollo itself, not only in space science, before the UN
General Assembly.11) The reasons were the following: the cooperative atmosphere
right after the conclusion of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) in August 1963,
the final conclusion of the NASA-Soviet Science Academy agreement on space
science in the same month, and the increasing criticism toward the huge cost of
Project Apollo. However, as Kennedy had decided on the proposal with two Special
Assistants for the President, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. and McGeorge Bundy, just a
few days before his speech, even Vice President Johnson didn’t know it until the
last minute.
While Kennedy’s proposal brought surprise and confusion to the U.S. domestic
society, especially Congress, the Soviet Union assumed an ambiguous attitude
toward it. But on 26 October 1963, Soviet Premier Khrushchev stated at a press
conference that “We are not at present planning flight by cosmonauts to the
moon. . . . We do not want to compete with the sending of people to the moon
without careful preparation.”12) This statement plunged Project Apollo into a crisis.
U.S. Congress and the White House started to examine the slowdown of Project
Apollo and review the whole U.S. space program.
At that time, Jerome B. Wiesner, Special Assistant to the President for Science
and Technology, proposed to Kennedy “a joint program in which the USSR
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provides unmanned exploratory and logistic support for the U.S. Apollo manned
landing.”13) Accepting the proposal, Kennedy ordered NASA Administrator James
E. Webb to prepare a specific plan along the line, by issuing the National Security
Action Memorandum No. 271 on 12 November 1963.14)
The Department of State was formulating the U.S. policy for the compatibility
between Project Apollo and space cooperation with the Soviet Union. The internal
document stated that:
“it seems clear that net national U.S. advantage lies in sticking with
the policy of going to the moon as quickly as possible—alone if
need be but preferably with maximum feasible international
cooperation—without the Russians if need be but preferably with
them. Credit would accrue to the U.S. for national success in
sending an American to be the first man on the moon; even greater
credit, in the minds of most non-Americans, would accrue to the
nation which leads a cooperative enterprise and makes the leading
contribution to it.”15)
In short, its conclusion was that the United States should certainly advance
Project Apollo while pursuing the maximum amount of space cooperation with the
Soviet Union, and moreover that the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai
E. Stevenson should repeat Kennedy’s joint lunar proposal again at the UN General
Assembly the next month. However, President Kennedy fell to an assassin’s bullet
in Dallas, Texas on 22 November 1963.
Kennedy’s Legacy: Apollo and U.S.-Soviet Cooperation
In the first weeks after Kennedy’s assassination, the new President Johnson
basically continued the policies of the Kennedy administration, including Project
Apollo. What Johnson had to do first as President was to gain the confidence of
many people that felt grief and despair over the death of their beloved leader and
then had a sense of mistrust toward the new one. As previously arranged, the U.S.
Ambassador Stevenson made the following speech at the First Committee of the
UN General Assembly on 2 December 1963:
“President Kennedy proposed before the General Assembly last
September to explore with the Soviet Union opportunities for
working together in the conquest of space, including the sending of
men to the moon as representatives of all our countries. President
Johnson has instructed me to reaffirm that offer today. . . . We
should explore the opportunities for practical cooperation,
45OSAKA UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW No. 57 (February 2010)
beginning with small steps and hopefully leading to larger ones. . . .
In any event, our policy of engaging in mutually beneficial and
mutually supporting cooperation in outer space—with the Soviet
Union as with all nations—does not begin or end with a manned
moon landing. There is plenty of work yet to come before that—
and there will be even more afterward.”16)
Right after Stevenson’s speech, the further approach to the Soviet Union was
discussed within the Department of State. The internal document stated that:
“It is possible that the Soviets do not feel that they are called upon
to make any particular reply to a proposal set forth and repeated in
speeches before the United Nations. Therefore, it would seem
advisable at some time early in 1964 to make a private bilateral
approach to the USSR, asking whether the Soviet would like to
discuss the possibilities of cooperation on a manned lunar
landing.”17)
However, there appeared a sign of change in President Johnson’s stance toward
U.S.-Soviet space cooperation. In his first State of the Union Message on 8 January
1964, Johnson mentioned that “we must assure our pre-eminence in the peaceful
exploration of outer space, focusing on an expedition to the moon in this decade—
in cooperation with other powers if possible, alone if necessary.”18) This wording
seemed to be a little more competition-oriented than Stevenson’s statement one
month before.
Johnson was waiting for a final report which Kennedy asked in November 1963
NASA Administrator Webb to prepare. On 31 January 1964, Webb submitted to
Johnson the report titled “US-USSR Cooperation in Space Research Programs.”19)
It recommended that:
“On balance, the most realistic and constructive group of proposals
which might be advanced to the Soviet Union, . . . , relates to a joint
program of unmanned flight projects to support a manned lunar
landing. These projects should be linked so far as possible to a step-
by-step approach, ranging from exchange of data already obtained
to joint planning of future flight missions.”
The report also recommended in detail about the timing and form of further U.S.
initiatives toward the Soviet Union that:
“(a) Continuing interest should be expressed through the existing
NASA-Soviet Academy channel, in a positive Soviet response to
the proposals for cooperation already made by President Kennedy
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and by you [President Johnson].
(b) No new high-level U.S. initiative is recommended until the
Soviet Union has had a further opportunity (possibly three months)
to discharge its current obligations under the existing NASA-USSR
Academy agreement, or, in the alternative, until the Soviets respond
affirmatively to the proposal you [President Johnson] have already
made in the UN. . . .”
From the very nature of things, NASA didn’t want its own programs, especially
Project Apollo, to be influenced by the ambiguous attitude of the Soviet Union,
though it never closed the window for international cooperation. In addition,
Kennedy’s science advisor Wiesner, who supported international space
cooperation, had already returned to his university at the change of government
because he had originally planned to be in the administration for only a few
years.20) Within the Johnson administration, there existed no strong advocate for
space cooperation.
President Johnson endorsed the Webb report by issuing the National Security
Action Memorandum No. 285 on 3 March 1964. It noted that:
“This report presents a reasonable and persuasive approach to a
program of cooperation with the Soviet Union in the field of outer
space. . . . I [President Johnson] will expect NASA and the other
responsible departments and agencies to keep this report under
continuing review, and to keep me currently advised of the progress
being made with the Soviet Academy under the current agreement,
and also of any Soviet response to our initiatives at the United
Nations on cooperation in outer space.”21)
The memorandum asked NASA Administrator Webb to prepare further
recommendations for President Johnson to deal with U.S.-Soviet space cooperation
“by the first of May.” Johnson seemed to want to decide on his general policy
including U.S. space policy by that time. In fact, Johnson set forth his own vision,
the “Great Society,” in late May.
Thus Johnson took the waiting stance by keeping open his options about U.S.-
Soviet joint lunar exploration without any more high-level initiatives. He also
approved the continuation of the NASA-Soviet Academy channel between NASA
Deputy Administrator Huge L. Dryden and Academician Anatoly A. Blagonravov
that had existed since the Kennedy administration. Both countries had concluded
the “Bilateral Space Agreement of 8 June 1962” and the follow-up “First
Memorandum of Understanding of 20 March and 24 May 1963.” As of the spring
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of 1964, the basic position of the Johnson administration was that the United States
should be prepared to go as far as the Soviet Union was willing to go, but should
not itself get out in front.22) It meant continuing pursuing the balanced U.S.-Soviet
space cooperation.
On 26 March 1964, Dryden wrote Blagonravov that the United States was
particularly interested in the possibility of coordinated launchings of experimental
weather satellites as well as in concluding final technical arrangements for
exchanges of satellite meteorological data.23) Under the previous agreements, both
countries were to cooperate in observations and tests utilizing the U.S. passive
communications satellite Echo 2. Although the U.S. side didn’t expect much
outcome of the Echo program, the Soviet side did forward the data to the U.S. side
when the satellite was actually launched on 25 January. This was the first
fulfillment of U.S.-Soviet space cooperation.
But there was no response from the Soviet Union to Dryden’s proposal as well
as the U.S. initiative at the United Nations. Therefore on 30 April, Webb requested
Johnson’s approval to defer any further recommendations on U.S.-Soviet space
cooperation to the President until late June because Dryden and Blagonravov would
meet at the UN Outer Space Committee in Geneva from 22 May to 12 June.24)
Johnson’s Incremental Decision to Implement Project Apollo
1964 was the year when Johnson had to not only guide the United States toward
stability by setting Kennedy’s unfinished policies on track, but also win the
presidential election. Johnson needed his own policy slogan like Kennedy’s “New
Frontier.” On 22 May 1964, Johnson announced his larger vision, the “Great
Society,” to enrich and elevate American national life and civilization.25) Project
Apollo was part of the “Great Society” because it would induce both short- and
long-term economic growth.26)
At the UN meeting in Geneva, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed a
“Second Memorandum of Understanding and a Protocol” for space cooperation on
6 June 1964.27) They provided for further implementation of the existing
agreements, particularly the establishment and use of the Washington-Moscow
weather data link, called later the “cold line,” and new cooperation in the
preparation and publication of a major review of space biology and medicine.
Although having a meeting at the UN Outer Space Committee in New York again,
both countries could not agree on the joint review of space biology and medicine.
After all, without referring to the space biology and medicine project, the Second
Memorandum of Understanding was signed and became effective on 5 November
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1964.28) It was only little more than a reaffirmation of the previous agreements.
During the 1964 negotiations, the Soviet Union finally began its own human
lunar landing program on 3 August,29) and succeeded in launching the first three-
person spacecraft, Voskhod 1, on 12 October. Two days later, Nikita S. Khrushchev
was dismissed from Chairman’s post. The new Soviet leadership headed by Leonid
I. Brezhnev and Alexei N. Kosygin needed ideological and political orthodoxy
abroad and at home to get stability. They criticized Khrushchev for his policy
failures: coexistence with the United States, declining rates of economic growth,
the conflict with Communist China, restlessness in Eastern Europe, and so forth.
There could be no thought of partnership or friendship with the United States.30)
However, compared with those during the Kennedy administration, the U.S.-Soviet
relations in 1964 were not so bad that the United States had to cooperate with the
Soviet Union through Project Apollo. Rather, the relations produced the atmosphere
of space competition like after Sputnik and Gagarin.
In the 1964 presidential campaign, an issue on U.S. space policy was how to
advance Project Apollo. Until then, the Republicans had criticized not only the
huge cost of Project Apollo but also Johnson’s space cooperation policy through the
NASA-Soviet Academy channel.31) Johnson as Democratic presidential candidate
argued that the United States should carry on Project Apollo “to maintain our
position of leadership of the Free World,” stressing values of broad international
cooperation without referring to the possibility of the U.S.-Soviet joint lunar
exploration.32)
On the other hand, Senator Barry M. Goldwater as Republican presidential
candidate asserted that the United States should balance Project Apollo with other
space programs, especially military ones, and in international space cooperation
“give first priority to joint work with our Allies—the advanced free democracies—
rather than with the Communist nations.”33) But the polls in the spring and fall of
1964 showed that three quarters of the public said Project Apollo should be
maintained at its current pace or speeded up.34) Under the slogan of the “Great
Society,” Johnson won the 1964 presidential election and became the elected U.S.
President.
In December 1964, NASA Administrator Webb reported to President Johnson
the situations about U.S.-Soviet space science cooperation, by concluding that:
“Our experience since June suggests that the Soviets are willing to
cooperate in a generalized and limited way, but that they remain
relatively inflexible with respect to commitments in negotiation and
are laggard in execution. . . . We shall continue to examine our
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developing program for possible opportunities for cooperation with
the Soviet Union. For the immediate future, it might be useful to
convey to top Soviet leadership, as opportunity affords, our
dissatisfaction with the painfully slow and limited progress to date,
as well as with Soviet reluctance to enter into reasonable
arrangements for implementing agreements. It may be that Soviet
leadership does not know of these limitations in performance.”35)
But Johnson did not accept the idea of interacting with the top Soviet leadership.
Through the presidential campaign, Johnson had almost decided that the United
States should implement Project Apollo through competition with the Soviet Union,
while trying to advance U.S.-Soviet space cooperation through the NASA-Soviet
Academy channel without any high-level initiative. After that, Johnson would
basically entrust space matters to the new Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey as
Chairman of the National Aeronautics and Space Council (NASC). Thus, U.S.-
Soviet space cooperation was not mentioned in either Johnson’s State of the Union
Message of 4 January or his inaugural address of 20 January 1965.36)
Space Cooperation with the Western Countries
One day before NASA Administrator Webb submitted to President Johnson his
report about U.S.-Soviet space cooperation, on 30 January 1964, the Department of
State finished a report titled “Planning Implications for National Security of Outer
Space in the 1970s.”37) The report was “a pioneering study, the first to relate the
scientific-technical intelligence and political factors involved in our future space
policy relating to national security problems.” It recommended that the United
States should “seek international cooperation in space and space-related activities
not only from the point of view of gaining such foreign support as our program may
require, but also from the standpoint of the broader foreign policy objectives which
can be served.” It also stated that the United States “will have to take account of
active and increasingly sophisticated space programs conducted by other countries,
particularly the Western European countries and Japan.”
Around the mid 1960s, other countries, following the United States and the
Soviet Union, were emerging in space activities. While the Vietnam War was
intensifying, President Johnson suggested to NASA Administrator Webb in
September 1965 that U.S. space programs should contribute further to U.S. foreign
policy objectives.38) Since then, the United States started to advance space
cooperation with Europe, especially West Germany and France, and Japan as one of
its diplomatic measures. The purposes were to strengthen the containment policy
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against the Communist bloc, to prevent the outflow of their space technology to
third countries, to maintain the U.S.-dominated INTELSAT established in August
1964, and to control their capability to develop nuclear weapons delivery system.
From 1966 to mid 1967, the United States arranged the conditions, as shown in the
National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 294, 338, and 354, to extend
space cooperation with Europe first and then Japan.39)
President Johnson also directed that the United States should take active steps to
encourage the construction of earth-station links to the worldwide communications
satellite system in selected less-developed countries by issuing NSAM 342 in
March 1966.40) Thus the Johnson administration was striving to advance space
cooperation not only with the Soviet Union but also with other countries, especially
the Western countries.
On the same day as the Department of States finished the report on the 1970s
space activities, on 30 January 1964, President Johnson asked NASA Administrator
Webb to describe NASA’s future program after Apollo. In May 1964, Webb
proposed two programs, the exploration of Mars through an unmanned landing and
further exploration of the Moon.41) But during 1964, Johnson made an incremental
decision to implement Project Apollo through completion with the Soviet Union,
and as his only priority. Therefore, Johnson took a two-track approach to NASA
space programs: supporting Project Apollo and resisting the post-Apollo planning.
Disappearance of U.S.-Soviet Joint Lunar Exploration
After the ouster of Khrushchev, U.S.-Soviet relations got worse as the United
States began its first bombings of North Vietnam while the new Soviet Premier
Kosygin visited Hanoi in February 1965. But NASA Deputy Administrator Dryden
continued his endeavor to promote U.S.-Soviet space cooperation. In March and
April 1965, he proposed to Blagonravov several new and specific possibilities of
U.S.-Soviet space cooperation: avoiding planetary contamination and coordinating
their unmanned probes to Mars and other planets. But Blagonravov replied that the
Soviet Union once again had no interest in either these or other new proposals and
it was backing away from the bilateral relationship itself.42)
Around that time, the Soviet side was interested in space competition, not
cooperation, with the United States. On 18 March 1965, Soviet cosmonaut Alexei
A. Leonov aboard Voskhod 2 succeeded in the first spacewalk. Soviet new leader
Brezhnev, like Khrushchev at the time of Sputnik and Gagarin, publicized Leonov’s
walk televised as the evidence of Soviet national power. Two and half months later,
on 3 June 1965, U.S. astronaut Edward H. White aboard Gemini 4 succeeded in the
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first American spacewalk.
Still Dryden continued the exchange of opinions with Blagonravov at the
meeting of the international Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) in May
1965. Dryden directly inquired whether the political and military situation had any
effect on their space cooperation relationship. Blagonravov relied that “the political
situation did not have any effect on the cooperation between the USSR Academy of
Sciences and NASA” and “in all these [space] endeavors it was indeed rather hard
to get away from the military.”43) At the end of the COSPAR meeting, the Soviet
side concluded that in order to broaden space cooperation “we must first have real
disarmament.”44)
While there was almost no progress in the negotiations for U.S.-Soviet space
science cooperation, the basic U.S. space policy was under consideration within the
Johnson administration. On 13 April 1965, Vice President Humphrey first as
Chairman held the National Aeronautics and Space Council (NASC) to discuss
international aspects of space program. He asserted that “our activities in space and
in aeronautics are important parts of President Johnson’s Great Society” and
“international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space is a cornerstone of
United States policy.”45)
After the meeting of NASC, the Department of State prepared the following
report from the viewpoint of U.S. national security and international posture.
“The latest world-wide opinion survey conducted by USIA [United
States Information Agency] early in 1964 in nineteen countries and
major cities indicated that, by large margins, the public abroad
believes that the USSR is ahead of the U.S. in space activities and,
perhaps by association, in nuclear strength and general scientific
development. . . .
An improvement in the image abroad of our space program relative
to that of the Soviets requires first and foremost successful
completion of the space flight programs to which the U.S. is
already committed publicly. . . .
In addition, such improvement will require an enlarged public
relations program and extension of the NASA international
cooperative programs. . . .
It is also important that we take advantage of all significant
opportunities to extend the development and use of practical
applications of space technology which can engage the effective
participation of other countries and from which other countries can
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derive direct benefit, e.g.: communications satellites, meteorologi-
cal satellites and broadcast satellites.”46)
For U.S. foreign policy objectives, the report stressed to advance both human
spaceflight programs, Gemini and Apollo, and international cooperation in practical
applications.47) This was the very basic U.S. space policy of the Johnson
administration.
Interestingly enough, President Johnson also gave a little thought to a possible
new initiative for U.S.-Soviet joint lunar exploration. He asked Dryden to draw up a
specific proposal for his address, which was scheduled to deliver at the celebration
in June 1965 of the twentieth anniversary of the United Nations. Johnson might
have wanted to ease the intensifying moon race to some extent. Dryden responded
with a draft recommending that:
“First, the United Nations establish a U.N. Commission on Lunar
Exploration to formulate additional principles to guide nationally
sponsored exploratory expeditions in their activities on the
moon. . . .
Second, the United States and the USSR establish a joint US-USSR
Commission on Lunar Exploration for the following purposes:
1. To report to the United Nations the present status of the national
expeditions now in progress for unmanned scientific investigations
of the moon and the initial manned landings and return. . . .
2. To plan a joint program for the further exploration of the lunar
surface during the next decade, to include joint expeditions and
bases, exchange of personnel and participation by other countries
and by representatives of the UN.
3. To prepare the draft of a bilateral implementing agreement for
consideration by the US and the USSR, leading to an officially
approved treaty.”48)
These proposals were too ambitious and ideal. Johnson rejected them and did
not refer to space at the UN anniversary celebration on 25 June 1965. At that
moment, the possibility of the U.S.-Soviet joint lunar exploration disappeared from
the policy choices of the Johnson administration.
Persistence in U.S.-Soviet Space Cooperation
But Johnson didn’t abandon the pursuit of U.S.-Soviet space cooperation in
general. After the flight of Gemini 5 on 21 August 1965, Johnson proposed
officially both the deliberations on space law at the United Nations and the U.S.-
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Soviet space exchange as follows:
“We believe the heavens belong to the people of every country. We
are working and we will continue to work through the United
Nations—our distinguished Ambassador, Mr. Goldberg, is present
with us this morning—to extend the rule of law into outer space.We
intend to live up to our agreement not to orbit weapons of mass
destruction and we will continue to hold out to all nations,
including the Soviet Union, the hand of cooperation in the exciting
years of space exploration which lie ahead for all of us. Therefore, I
have—today, in fact—directed Mr. James Webb, the administrator
of our civilian space program, after conferring with the Secretary of
State and our Ambassador to the United Nations and others, to
invite the Soviet Academy of Science[s] to send a very high level
representative here next month to observe the launching of Gemini
6.
I hope that he will find it convenient to come. We will certainly
give him a warm welcome in America.”49)
In the internal circular telegram, Secretary of State Dean Rusk explained that
“This invitation is part of continuing US efforts seek ways to improve relations
with USSR where possible. Presence [of] Soviet scientist at Gemini VI launch
would dramatize public, open nature of our space program. Hopefully it would lead
to further moves toward US-Soviet cooperation [in] this field. It should be noted
invitation extended without condition of reciprocity.”50)
The Soviet side refused the invitation just by stating that “Soviet Scientists
positively evaluate cooperation between our countries in the study of cosmic space
for purposes of its peaceful use. However at the present time our representative
cannot avail himself of your invitation.”51) The U.S.-Soviet relations were getting
worse because of the Vietnam War, and the Soviet couldn’t show American
scientists the Soviet top-secret rocket launchings in return, though the U.S. side
hadn’t asked for it.52)
Again through the NASA-Soviet Science Academy channel, Dryden tried to
work out a new arrangement for the space medicine projects during the session of
the UN Outer Space Committee of October 1965.53) On 6 January 1966, NASA
Administrator Webb, who had taken over as the U.S. representative owing to the
sudden death of Dryden, asked Blagonravov to share the results of experiments
conducted by Soviet Venera 3, which succeeded in the first impact on Venus on 16
November 1965. Blagonravov replied that he didn’t have the authority to give the
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information.54) Between March and May 1966, Webb suggested to Blagonravov
that the Soviet side propose areas for discussion to extend space cooperation
between the two countries. Blagonravov replied that the Soviet Union was not yet
ready for further cooperation.55) Around that time, the Soviet side had been
confused as Sergey P. Korolev, Chief Designer of the Soviet space programs, was
down by illness and died on 14 January 1966.56)
Nevertheless, the Soviet side suddenly began to furnish satellite meteorological
data through the inactive “cold line” on 11 September 1966, and continued until the
spring of 1967. This was the second fulfillment of U.S.-Soviet space cooperation,
following the Echo satellite experiments in early 1964. In response, President
Johnson made the following statement at a joint communiqué on space cooperation
between the United States and West Germany on 27 September 1966:
“But we go beyond that. We seek—and we shall continue to seek—
cooperation in space with the Soviet Union. We have an agreement
to exchange certain kinds of space data. We have shared
information on variations in the earth’s magnetic field. We will
soon publish jointly American and Soviet material on space biology
and medicine.”57)
In parallel with the persistent pursuit of U.S.-Soviet space cooperation, the
Johnson administration had been striving to develop the deliberations on space
treaty at the United Nations.58) In May 1966, President Johnson announced that “we
need a treaty laying down rules and procedures for the exploration of celestial
bodies. . . . I am asking Ambassador Goldberg, in New York, to seek early
discussions of such a treaty in the appropriate United Nations body.”59) This
announcement triggered the submission of each space treaty draft by the United
States and the Soviet Union between June and September. After the heated
discussions and concessions between both countries, the UN General Assembly
adopted the Resolution 2222 (XXI) including a draft of the “Treaty of Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the Outer Space Treaty)” on 19
December 1966.60)
Why did the United States and the Soviet Union reach an agreement of the
Outer Space Treaty? First, both countries wanted to prevent the expansion of
armaments into space by excluding the inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM).
Second, both countries tried to show their improved relations to the world through
the conclusion of the Outer Space Treaty because the United States suffered from
the Vietnam War while the Sino-Soviet split was growing. Third, both countries
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wanted to take legal measures concerning outer space and the celestial bodies while
they were competing fiercely to go to the moon. Thus, there existed three kinds of
strategies of both countries: nuclear, diplomacy and space. Above all, it is
important that the moon race and the Outer Space Treaty were the two sides of
international space activities during the 1960s: competition and cooperation.
On 27 January 1967, U.S. Apollo 204, later renamed Apollo 1, caught fire and
killed three American astronauts; on the same day, the Outer Space Treaty was
signed by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. On 23
April, Soviet Soyuz 1 capsule crashed and killed a cosmonaut. Webb asserted at a
press conference that the United States and the Soviet Union should cooperate more
effectively in space activities to prevent space accidents.61) Subsequently, Webb
proposed to Blagonravov that during the COSPAR meeting scheduled in July, both
countries get together to review progress “as required every six months under the
Bilateral Space Agreement.” But Blagonravov rejected the meeting on the grounds
that he was unable to arrange the presence of Soviet experts.62)
From 23 to 25 June 1967, U.S. President Johnson and Soviet Premier Kosygin
met at Glassboro, New Jersey. They discussed the problems on the Middle East,
Vietnam, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), antiballistic missiles
(ABM), and nuclear nonproliferation, which led to the conclusion of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on 1 July 1968. Although the tensions between
both countries were easing somewhat, space cooperation didn’t seem to be placed
on the summit ageda except the Outer Space Treaty.
While there was no obvious change in the interactions through NASA-Soviet
Academy channel, Edward C. Welsh, Executive Secretary of NASC, reported on 9
October 1967 to Vice President Humphrey that:
“It has been and continues to be the policy of the U.S. to seek areas
of mutually beneficial cooperation with the USSR in space
activities. This policy practice is based on the assumption that such
cooperation would improve relations between the two nations and
might introduce some economy either by joint projects or through
coordinated avoidance of unnecessary duplication of effort. . . .
In spite of this gloomy picture regarding Soviet cooperation, it
seems reasonable that we should continue to try not only because it
might assist in the space program, but also because it might have
broader international impact.”63)
Accepting the recommendations of his space advisors, President Johnson
continued to explore U.S.-Soviet space cooperation. He made the following speech
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at a special White House ceremony celebrating the coming into force of the Outer
Space Treaty on 10 October 1967:
I want to renew, therefore, today, America’s offer to cooperate fully
with any nation that may wish to join forces in this last—and
greatest—journey of human exploration. Space is a frontier
common to all mankind and it should be explored and conquered by
humanity acting in concert.
We have urged cooperation:
—in exploring the planets, or any portion of the solar system,
—in the use of tracking facilities, so that our brave astronauts and
cosmonauts may fly with much greater safety,
—in mapping the earth,
—in exchanging bioscientific information, and,
—in international satellite communications.
We again renew these offers today. They are only the beginnings of
what should be a long, cooperative endeavor in exploring the
heavens together. . . .
The first decade of the space age has witnessed a kind of contest.
We have been engaged in competitive spacemanship. We have
accomplished much, but we have also wasted much energy and
resources in duplicated or overlapping effort.
The next decade should increasingly become a partnership—not
only between the Soviet Union and America, but among all nations
under the sun and the stars.64)
This speech recapitulated what the space policy of the Johnson administration
was. But the Soviet side made no direct response to Johnson’s proposal to revive
U.S.-Soviet space cooperation. Also, the negotiations over space cooperation
through the NASA-Soviet Academy channel remained deadlocked. Finally, both
countries couldn’t realize any substantive space cooperation between them, except
for the Outer Space Treaty, during the 1960s.
The Johnson administration concluded many agreements with the Soviet Union
during five years.65) The U.S.-Soviet relations in general were not so bad in spite of
the Vietnam War and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. In
particular, the Outer Space Treaty was the fruit of international space cooperation
between both countries. Thanks to that, the Johnson administration could advance
Project Apollo through competition with the Soviet Union while the Soviet Union
didn’t have to compromise other negotiations over space cooperation. Within the
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United States, NASA plunged into budget crises almost every year during the
Johnson administration. But President Johnson’s ultimate support and NASA
Administrator Webb’s great effort enabled Project Apollo to progress almost as
scheduled.66)
In the end, there was the extremely keen moon race in the late 1960s.67) In the
summer of 1968, the United States got the information that the Soviet Union would
attempt the first human circumlunar flight ahead of the United States, in order to
diminish the political effect of the first human lunar landing by the United States.
As NASA hurriedly moved up its flight schedule, the United States succeeded in
the first human circumlunar flight by Apollo 8 on 21 December 1968. The Soviet
Union also refused to back down when the United States launched Apollo 11. On 3
July, the Soviet Union tried to launch the giant N-1 rocket, equivalent to the U.S.
Saturn rocket to launch the Apollo spacecraft, but the Soviet rocket collapsed back
onto the pad. Still on 13 July, the Soviet Union launched the unmanned probe, Luna
15, to return a sample of moon rocks. But the Soviet probe crashed into the surface
of the moon. Following Kennedy’s pledge, the United States succeeded in the first
human lunar landing by Apollo 11 on 20 July 1969, half a year after President
Johnson left office.
Conclusion
The Johnson administration implemented Project Apollo through competition
with the Soviet Union while trying to advance other space programs through
cooperation with the Soviet Union as well as other Western countries.
Since the Sputnik shock, Lyndon B. Johnson was involved in U.S. space policy.
He repeatedly asserted that the United States should win the space race with the
Soviet Union, but also advocated international space cooperation through the
United Nations. In the Kennedy administration, Johnson as Vice president and
Chairman of NASC contributed to the decision on Project Apollo in May 1961,
arguing that the United States should attain world leadership in space.
Although the Kennedy administration pursued further both space competition,
by Project Apollo, and space cooperation, by space science programs, with the
Soviet Union, President Kennedy proposed U.S.-Soviet joint lunar exploration in
September 1963. After Kennedy’s assassination, the new President Johnson took
over Project Apollo with the joint lunar proposal. But he took a waiting stance with
regard to the proposal, by continuing the NASA-Soviet Academy negotiations
without any more high-level initiatives. Because of the start of the Soviet human
lunar landing program, the ouster of Soviet Premier Khrushchev, and the U.S.
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presidential campaign in 1964, Johnson made an incremental decision to implement
Project Apollo through competition, not cooperation, with the Soviet Union.
While the Vietnam War was intensifying, the possibility of U.S.-Soviet joint
lunar exploration disappeared in mid 1965. But the Johnson administration
continued to pursue U.S.-Soviet space science cooperation while extending space
cooperation with other Western countries. The conclusion of the Outer Space
Treaty in January 1967 and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in July
1968 relaxed the East-West tensions, while the United States and the Soviet Union
were running the fierce moon race. Although the Apollo budget was always
criticized during his administration, Johnson continued to support Project Apollo to
the end. Therefore, the credit for the implementation and success of Project Apollo
should go to Johnson, though the first human lunar landing was realized during the
next Nixon administration.
Why did the possibility of U.S.-Soviet joint lunar exploration disappear from the
policy choices of the Johnson administration? Or, why did President Johnson reach
the conclusion that Project Apollo should be implemented through not cooperation
but competition with the Soviet Union?
The first reason was the “moderate” U.S.-Soviet relations of those days. Despite
the Vietnam War and the Soviet hard-line policy, the relations didn’t need Project
Apollo through space cooperation. If it had been better, both countries could have
realized more U.S.-Soviet space cooperation. Also if it had been worse like during
the Kennedy administration, the joint lunar exploration might have been needed to
relax the tensions.
The second was the U.S. domestic politics. Most of the U.S. people, especially
Republicans, didn’t want the joint lunar exploration. They hoped to win the space
race to the moon because they had experienced the feeling of defeat in the past two
races: the first satellite, Sputnik, and the first human spaceflight, Gagarin. In
addition, the joint lunar exploration would become the reason to reduce the budget
of Project Apollo because the space race during the Cold War was one of the main
reasons to maintain the huge space budget.
The third was the division of roles in the space policy of the Johnson
administration. The purpose of Project Apollo during the Kennedy administration
was not only the display of U.S. power and ideas but also the relaxation of the
tensions in the Cold War.68) But the Johnson administration advanced other space
programs, especially the space science program and the conclusion of the Outer
Space Treaty, through cooperation with the Soviet Union to ease the East-West
tensions. Therefore, the administration could implement Project Apollo through
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competition with the Soviet Union only to display U.S. power and ideas. Moreover,
the Johnson administration advanced other space programs, such as INTELSAT,
through cooperation with the Western countries to strengthen the bloc.
The fourth was the actual progress of U.S. and Soviet space programs. During
1964, the United States began the development of the Apollo spacecraft and the
Saturn booster rocket, and the Soviet Union finally started its human lunar landing
program. In terms of space technology, the window for the joint lunar exploration
might be open only around when Kennedy proposed in the fall of 1963.
The combination of all these reasons made the possibility of U.S.-Soviet joint
lunar exploration disappear from the policy choices of the Johnson administration
in mid 1965. Most of all, the comprehensive space policies of the Johnson
administration enabled President Johnson to reach the conclusion that Project
Apollo should be implemented through not cooperation but competition with the
Soviet Union. In order to implement Project Apollo as scheduled, the Johnson
administration needed the space competition, rather than cooperation, with the
Soviet Union.
Through the implementation of Project Apollo, the United States displayed its
national power and ideas, or values, and regained its international status in the field
of space activities, though the Johnson administration couldn’t regain the domestic
public support because of the hopeless Vietnam War. It is true that Project Apollo
was a symbol of the U.S.-Soviet space race during the Cold War. However, it
should be noted that the Johnson administration implemented Project Apollo by
keeping the balance between international competition and cooperation through its
comprehensive space policy. The balance meant pursuing cooperation in the
competition. Thereby, the United States attained world leadership in space.
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